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NOTES
language used in the act itself and the subject matter thereof. This act,
as amended, passed the Senate on April 7, 1925, and passed the House
on April 6, 1925. On April 8th both the House and the Sen-
ate agreed to a final adjournment on April 9th, and both did
adjourn on that day. It will be seen that at the time of the passage of
this act the members of the General Assembly knew with reasonable
certainty when the body of the act would go into effect; so the provision
regarding the time when the four sections would become operative was
well known to the members of that body. It is reasonable to presume
that the act would not have been passed by the General Assembly with-
out the provision regarding said four sections, for the act was amended
in both legislative bodies, and it required a conference committee to
finally agree on the terms thereof, and it did not pass both bodies till
near the end of the session. To disregard the provisions regarding said
four sections would be clearly in violation of the act.
The members of the General Assembly well knew that this act
could be suspended under the initiative and referendum, as similar acts
passed by former assemblies were suspended and were rejected by the
people. We must therefore presume that the members of the General
Assembly intended to give employers, insurance companies and the Com-
missioners the fifty-four days after most of the act went into effect be-
fore sections 2 to 4, inclusive, and section 34 should become effective.
And the people of the State, in voting on this proposition at the Novem-
ber election, knew that this legislative act provided that these four sec-
tions should not take effect until fifty-four days after the ratification of
the act; and it must also be presumed that they knew the reasons there-
for, to all of which the people signified their approval at the November
election. I am, therefore, of the opinion that said four sections, which
refer to the liability of employers to employes, do not take effect until
fifty-four days after November 16, 1926, and the Commission is not
justified in attempting to assume jurisdiction in the settlement of claims
by employes against employers till then.
In support of my opinion I respectfully refer you to the following:
State ex rel v. Pond, 93 Mo. 1. c. 624-6.
Salem Hospital v. Olcott, 67 Oregon 448, 136 Pac. 341.
Whittaker v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 133 Mo. App. 664.
State ex rel v. Edwards, 136 Mo. I. c. 567-8.
NORTii T. GENTRY,
Attorney-General.
ENFORCEMENT OF A MONEY JUDGMENT AGAINST A
STATE
The problem of the exact extent of the powers which may be exer-
cised by the government of the United States without encroaching upon
the rights of the constituent states, far from being settled by past judicial
decisions, is still a subject of heated debate in some quarters, and will
probably remain an open question for many years to come. One inter-
esting phase of this general problem is the extent of the power of the
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Supreme Court of the United States to enforce a judgment against a
State, granting the judgment to be one which the court had jurisdiction
to render. The problem may be stated more specifically in the follow-
ing two questions: (1) May the Supreme Court, in an appropriate
case, issue a writ of mandamus to the legislature of a State to com-
pel it to levy a tax to pay a money judgment lawfully rendered against
the State? (2) If so, may the court, in the event the legislature re-
fuses to obey such mandamus, levy and collect such a tax through its
own officers to satisfy the judgment?" When thus stated, the im-
portance of the problem becomes evident, as it is not to be expected
that an affirmative answer to either of these questions will be ac-
cepted by the champions of state sovereignty unless and until it is
unequivocally declared to be the law by the highest tribunal of the land.
Some writers, indeed, 2 seem to consider the matter as practically set-
tled by the decision in the case of Virginia v. West Virginia3 in favor
of the power of the Supreme Court to use any means necessary to exe-
cute its judgments. If this is the true view of the law, whenever the
necessity may arise, the Supreme Court may resort to such extreme
measures as dictating to the legislature of a "sovereign State" the pas-
sage of a tax bill, or even usurping the wholly non-judicial function of
levying a tax itself. But these authors, though entitled to the greatest
respect in their expression of opinion as to what the law is or ought to
be, aside from any particular case, are not justified in reading into the
Virginia v. West Virginia case the implication of such extreme powers.
All that case decided was that the Supreme Court had a right, and, in
fact, a duty to enforce the judgment rendered in the cause, but the
question of what means of enforcement were appropriate, was deferred
for further argument-an indication, surely, that there was some doubt
in the court's mind as to whether it could issue a mandamus to compel
the levy of a tax. In view of the nature of the parties involved, the
distinction between deciding that the court had a general power to en-
force its judgment against the defendant State, and deciding that it had
the power to use any particular mode of execution, can not be considered
negligible.
Since it has never been directly decided that the Supreme Court has
power to compel by mandamus the levy of a tax to pay a judgment
against a state, the only justification for assuming that it has such
power must be looked for in the decisions of more or less analagous
cases and the dicta of the court. A review of all relevant cases will
show that the proposition that this power exists in the court has not
even the support which a unanimous line of dicta would give it.
But before reviewing the authorities, it will be interesting to observe
'Of course, no execution could be issued against the property of the State
which is used for public purposes.2 William C. Coleman, "The State as Defendant under the Federal Constitu-
tion; the Virginia-West Virginia Debt Controversy," 31 HARv. LAW REV., 210;
Thomas Reed Powell, "Coercing a State to Pay a Judgment: Virginia v. West
Virginia, 17 MICHIGAN LAW REV., 1.
'Commonwealth of Virginia v. State of West Virginia, 246, U. S., 565, 38
S. Ct., 400, 62 L. Ed., 883 (1918).
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how it has happened that the court has been able even to the present day
to postpone a direct decision on the question. The effect of Chisholm
v. Georgia' holding that a money judgment could be recovered against
a State by a citizen of another State, was destroyed by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution, which removed from the jurisdiction
of the federal courts all suits by citizens of one State against another
State,5 the largest class of cases in which the problem of execution
against a State might have arisen. This left only suits against a State
by the United States, a foreign country, or another State, in which the
problem might be raised, and these classes of cases must be further
limited by excluding all cases involving merely boundary disputes, as
not calling for the recovery of money damages from the defendant
State. Such cases as Kansas v. Colorado6 would also have to be ex-
cluded, because the relief, if granted, would have consisted merely in
the prohibition of certain acts of the defendant State-in the case re-
ferred to, the using of water from the Arkansas River for irrigation,
to the prejudice of the plaintiff State. The first case since the Eleventh
Amendment was interpreted by Hollingsworth et al v. Virginia7 in
which an attempt was made to recover a money judgment against a
State, was New Hampshire v. Louisiana,8 in which such judgment was
refused on the ground that it was only nominally a suit between two
States, the real parties plaintiff being citizens of New Hampshire, and
hence the Eleventh Amendment applied. At the same time was de-
cided the case of Louisiana ex rel Elliot et al v. Jumel,9 in which there
was, in effect, an attempt to recover a judgment against a State, though,
in form, only an attempt to compel officers of the State to pay over
sums due the relators on certain bonds issued by the State, performing
all duties necessary to effectuate this result, including levying and col-
lecting a tax. The Supreme Court held that the suit was in reality
against the State, and therefore was properly dismissed, as the State
was not, and could not have been made, a party defendant. Whether
such a suit against State officers could have been maintained in a case
where a judgment against the State had been lawfully obtained, was
not decided. In 1890, Hans v. Louisiana'0 decided that a suit against
a State, by a citizen of the same State, though not within the terms of
the Eleventh Amendment, could not be entertained by the federal
courts, on the familiar principle that a sovereign is not subject to suit
without its consent, and no consent to suits of this character could be im-
plied from the State's assent to the terms of the Constitution of the
United States. No suit by a foreign nation against a State of the
Union has come before the United States Supreme Court, a suit by an
Indian tribe against a State being excluded from this class, and in fact,
'2 Dall. 419, 1 L. Ed., 440 (1793).
" Including those then pending. Hollingsworth et al v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378,
1 L. Ed., 644 (1798).
'185 U. S., 125, 46 L. Ed. 838, 22 S. Ct., 552 (1902) ; 206 U. S., 46, 51 L. Ed.,
956, 27 S. Ct-, 655 (1907).
13 DalI., 378, 1 L. Ed., 644 (1798).
108 U. S., 76, 27 L. Ed., 656, 2 S. Ct., 176 (1883).
* 107 U. S., 711, 27 L. Ed., 448, 2 S. Ct., 128 (1883).
134 U. S., 1, 33 L. Ed., 842, 10 S. Ct., 504.
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excluded from the jurisdiction of the federal courts altogether."' No
suit by the United States against a State, in which a money judgment
might have been rendered, has reached the point where the means of
execution had to be considered. In United States v. State of North
Carolina2 judgment was in favor of defendant, and in United Statcs
v. State of Michigan 3 defendant's demurrer was overruled, but evi-
dently the case was settled without further contest, as there is no record
of an answer being subsequently filed.
Finally there came a case in which a test of the power of the Supreme
Court to enforce its judgment against a State bade fair to arise. South
Dakota v. North Carolina'4 was, like New Hampshire v. Louisiana,
supra, an action by one State on bonds issued by another State. But,
whereas in the earlier case the bonds had been assigned to the State
merely for the purpose of enabling suit to be brought on them for the
benefit of the privata individuals who were the real parties in interest,
in the later case the plaintiff State was the bona fide owner of the bonds,
by virtue of a gift, suing in its own interest, and no attempt to evade
the effect of the Eleventh Amendment could be imputed. A money
judgment against the State of North Carolina was rendered; but the
question whether the court could compel the levy of a tax to pay the
judgment was not decided, because the bonds in question were secured
by certain railroad stocks in which the defendant State had an interest,
which the court ordered sold to satisfy the judgment, reserving the
question of what should be done in case the sum so realized should
prove insufficient, until such contingency should actually occur. As a
matter of fact, the contingency did not occur, because the defendant
State finally acquiesced in, and paid, the judgment.;
Then came the case of Virginia v. West Virginia, involving a dispute
over the distribution of the public debt of the State of Virginia between
Virginia and West Virginia at the time of the separation of West Vir-
ginia from the mother State. This controversy came before the Su-
preme Court nine times, on various questions, some of which touched
on the power of the court to execute a judgment against the defendant
State, and some of which did not. In the original case' the court
merely disposed of a demurrer, and remarked incidentally,17 "It is not
to be presumed on demurrer that West Virginia would refuse to carry
out the decree of this court. If such repudiation should be absolutely
asserted we can then consider by what means the decree may be en-
forced." At each of the subsequent hearings, the consideration of the
means of execution was postponed, for one reason or another, 8 even
when there would have been no occasion for such postponement had
" Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 5 Pet., 1, 8 L. Ed., 25 (1831).
"136 U. S., 211, 34 L. Ed., 336, 10 S. Ct., 290 (1890).
- 190 U. S., 379, 47 L. Ed., 1103, 23 S. Ct., 742 (1903).
"192 U. S., 286, 48 L. Ed., 448, 24 S. Ct., 269 (1904).
This fact is stated by Justice Brewer, who delivered the opinion in South
Dakota v. North Carolina, in REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEriTING oF
THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 107, pp. 170,171.
"206 U. S., 290, 51 L. Ed., 1068, 27 S. Ct., 732.
"Page 319 in official report.
"209 U. S., 514, 52 L. Ed., 914, 28 S. Ct., 614. (Case referred to a master.)
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the suit been between private individuals. On several of these hear-
ings, the court expressed a hope that the defendant State would pay
the judgment of its own accord, and on the hearing preceding the final
one, the only reason assigned for denying execution was, that the State
might be given an opportunity so to pay. On the final hearing, though
the court asserted its authority to enforce its judgment, which was ad-
mitted at this time by the parties, it again evaded a direct answer as to
the means of execution by setting a future date for argument on the
propriety of a writ of mandamus ordering the legislature of West Vir-
ginia to levy a tax to pay the judgment, or of such other means of
execution as might be suggested. At the same time the court hinted
that it would welcome help from Congress in the form of a special
statutory remedy particularly applicable to the case, by deciding that
Congress had power to create such a remedy. As in the North Caro-
line case, supra, the court was relieved of the necessity of deciding on
the means of execution, by the eleventh hour acquiescence in, and pay-
ment of, the sum adjudged to be due, by the State of West Virginia,
without coercion, the money being raised by a bond issue.
Thus for over a hundred years since the adoption of the Constitution
has the question of the power of the United States Supreme Court to
enforce a money judgment against a State been unsettled, and even
now, though its power to enforce such such a judgment has been
definitely upheld, it is still an open question what means of execution
may be used. Whether a mandamus could, under any circumstances,
be used to compel a State legislature to levy a tax to pay such a judg-
ment, is a question the decision of which it is unsafe to predict, for what
few analagous decisions and relevant dicta there are do not agree in
their effect; and the same may be said of the further question, whether
the court could itself levy a tax to satisfy a judgment against a State.
The following summary of the arguments and authorities on each side
will make this apparent.
First, in favor of the power to issue a mandamus to compel the State
legislature to levy a tax, we have:
1. The decisions in Virginia v. West Virginia9 and South Dakota v.
North Carolina,2 0 already referred to, that the court may enforce a
money judgment by some means.
220 U. S., 1, 55 L. Ed., 353, 31 S. Ct., 330. (Hope of agreement between the
parties expressed after certain questions were adjudicated.)
222 U. S., 17, 56 L. Ed., 71, 32 S. Ct., 4. (Final decree deferred to give time
for legislature of West Virginia to meet)
231 U. S., 89, 58 L. Ed., 135, 34 S. Ct., 29. (Final judgment further postponed
until a commission appointed for the purpose should have an opportunity to
settle the matter out of court.)
234 U. S., 117, 58 L. Ed., 1243, 34 S. Ct, 889. (Because of the peculiar
character of the parties, case reopened after judgment to allow proof of credits
and other matters which would, if allowed, reduce the amount of the judgment.)
238 U. S., 202, 59 L. Ed., 1272, 35 S. Ct., 795. (These credits adjudicated, the
court tacitly assuming defendant State would submit to the decree.)
241 U. S., 521, 60 L. Ed., 1147, 36 S. Ct., 719. (Execution denied pending
meeting of newly elected legislature to give it an opportunity to take steps to
pay voluntarily.)
246 U. S., 565, 62 L. Ed.. 883, 38 S. Ct., 400. (Final hearing, discussed in the
text)
"See note 3.
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2. Certain broad statements to the effect that jurisdiction to render
a judgment includes full power to execute it, contained in cases not
involving a State as a party.21 Of course, the difference in the facts
makes these cases of little value in the present discussion.
3. A dictum by Chief Justice Waite, in Louisiana v. Jusne122 as fol-
lows: "When a State submits itself, without reservation, to the juris-
diction of a court in a particular case, that jurisdiction may be used to
give full effect to what the State has by its act of submission allowed to
be done; and if the law permits coercion of public officers to enforce any
judgment that may be rendered, then such coercion may be employed
for that purpose."
All of the preceding dicta and decisions, it will be seen, depend for
their relevancy to the point in issue, upon whether it is possible to im-
ply the power to issue a particular form of execution from the mere
power to execute a judgment, plus a state of facts making that form
of execution the only one which would be effectual.
4. In addition to the above, there is a group of cases, showing that
a mandamus to compel the levy of a tax to pay a judgment is not un-
known to the law, though it has hitherto been issued only against the
legislative bodies of municipalities, whose status is, of course, quite dif-
ferent from that of sovereign states.23
On the other hand, tending to deny the right to issue a mandamus
against a State legislature to levy a tax, we have:
1. The general principle that a State is sovereign within its own do-
main, and that the federal government can not control the officers of a
State government in the exercise of their powers as such, of which the
power of the legislature to levy a tax is certainly one.
2. The general principle that discretionary acts, which would include
the levying of a tax, can not be compelled by mandamus.
3. The following very positive but extra-judicial statement by Justice
Brewer, who delivered the opinion of the court in South Dakota v.
North Carolina, supra, referring to that case: "We could not compel
the Legislature of North Carolina to meet and pass an act; the marshal
could not levy upon the public buildings of the State; what would be
the significance of a judgment which the court was powerless to en-
force ?"24
4. In reply to any argument to the effect that the power to issue a
mandamus may be implied from necessity, where it is the only way to
enforce the duty of the State to pay a judgment, it may be shown that
there is at least one case, according to Kentucky v. Dennison,2 in which
a State or its officers may have a clear duty under the national Constitu-
' See note 14.
'Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed., 253 (1823); Bank of U. S. v.
Halstead, 10 Wheat 51, 6 L. Ed., 264 (1823); Gordon v. U. S., 2 Wall., 561,
17 L. Ed., 921 (1865), see also 117 U. S., 697.
' See note 9.
' Board of Supervisors of Rock Island County v. U. S. ex rel Von Hoffman
v. Quincy, 4 Wall., 535, 18 L. Ed., 403 (1867) ; U. S. ex rel Riggs v. Johnson
County, 6 Wall., 166, 18 L. Ed., 768 (1868); Labette County Commissjoners v.
U. S. ex rel. Moulton, 112 U. S., 217, 28 L. Ed., 698, 5 S. Ct., 118 (1884).
REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK CON-
FERENCE oN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 107, pp. 170-171.
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tion, which can not be enforced by federal authority, but depends for
performance on the honor and integrity of the representatives of the
State. The court in the case cited, though holding most emphatically
that the interstate rendition of fugitives from justice is an absolute
duty, refused to compel such rendition by a mandamus against the
governor of a State, on the ground that no power is given to the judi-
ciary or other department of the federal government to use any coercive
means to compel the performance of this constitutional duty.2 This
decision, though severely criticized as political, not judicial, has never
been overruled, and has been referred to as still being the law in several
later cases in the Supreme Court,27 including the comparatively recent
one of Drew v. Thaw, 28 though it has not been cited for the point men-
tioned. It must be admitted that including the duty of a State to pay
a judgment against it, among those which can not be enforced by the
federal government would be receding from the point reached by Vir-
ginia v. West Virginia; it is not so certain, however, that the duty
of the legislature to vote a tax to pay such a judgment is not one of
these unenforceable duties.
Even if the power of the Supreme Court to execute a judgment
against a State by means of a mandamus ordering the legislature of
the State to levy a tax be granted, the question of what could be done
in case the legislature refused to obey the mandamus, prefering to stand
committed for contempt, remains undecided. For the court to step
into the place of the legislature and levy the tax through its own officers
would be a usurpation of legislative functions by the judiciary which
is not even permitted in the case of a judgment against a municipality,
which admittedly can be enforced by a mandamus against the municipal
legislature. The following extracts are from cases which are authority
for this rule:
"This power to impose burdens and raise money is the highest
attribute of sovereignty, and is exercised, first, to raise money for
public purposes only; and, second, by the power of legislative au-
thority only. It is a power that has not been extended to the
judiciary. Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal ju-
diciary to assume the place of a State in the exercise of this au-
thority at once so delicate and so important." 29
'The power of taxation is legislative, and can not be exercised
otherwise than under the authority of the Legislature.1 30
"It is not only not one of the inherent powers of the court to
"24 How., 66, 16 L. Ed., 717 (1861).
" See William C. Coleman, "The State as Defendant under the Federal Con-
stitution; the Virginia-West Virginia Debt Controversy," 31 HARv. LAW REv.,
210.
"Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall., 366, 21 L Ed., 287 (1873) ; Ex parte Com. of
Virginia & Coles, 100 U. S., 339, 25 L. Ed., 676 (1880) ; Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S., 371, 25 L Ed., 717 (1880).
" 235 U. S., 432, 59 L. Ed., 302, 35 S. Ct., 137 (1914) ; p. 439 in official report.
"Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall., 107, 22 L. Ed., 72 (1873); p. 116 in
official report.
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levy and collect taxes, but it is an invasion by the judiciary of the
Federal Government of the legislative functions of the state
government."'
"Of course it does not follow from the fact that a court has
authority to issue a writ of mandamus to compel officers to perform
their duty that it can perform that duty in their place." 32
The language used in these cases would seem to be conclusive of the
question of the court's power to levy taxes to pay a judgment against
a State; but in the last of the above cases, Justice Holmes points out a
distinction between the case where a municipality is defendant and that
of an action against a State, which would leave it open to the court to
reach a different decision in the latter case. He says: " . . . the obli-
gation upon which the judgment was recovered3 3 was an obligation
under, not paramount to, the authority of the state. It is true that the
district court of the United States had jurisdiction of the suit upon
the contract, but the extent of the obligation imposed was determined
by the statutes of Missouri, not by the Constitution of the United States
or any extraneous source, the Constitution only requiring that tht obli-
gation of the contract should not be impaired by subsequent state law.
The plaintiff, by bringing suit in the United States court, acquired
no greater rights than were given to him by the local statutes. The right
so given was to have a tax levied and collected, it is true, but a tax
ordained by and depending on the sovereignty of the state, and there-
fore limited in whatever way the state saw fit to limit it when, so to
speak, it contracted to give the remedy. It is established that 'taxes of
the nature now in question can only be levied and collected in the man-
ner provided'34 by the statute, and therefore that it is impossible for
the courts to substitute their own appointee in place of the one contem-
plated by the act."
35
After this review of the authorities, all that can safely be said in
summing up is, that whether the Supreme Court of the United States
can enforce a money judgment properly rendered against a State of the
Union by means of a mandamus compelling the legislature of the State
to levy a tax to pay the judgment, and whether, if the preceding ques-
tion be answered in the affirmative, the court may itself levy a tax for
such purpose, through its own officers, if the legislature refuses to obey
such mandamus, are still open questions, capable of being decided
either way.
F. W. FIsCHER, '27.
"Meriwether et al v. Garrett & Sons, et al, 102 U. S., 472, 26 L. Ed., 197
(1880) ; p. 501 in official report.
"Heine v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall., 655, 22 L. Ed., 223
(1874); p. 661 in official report.
'Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U. S., 50, 59 L. Ed., 460, 35 S. Ct., 235 (1915);
p. 57 in official report.
'Against a county.
" The words in single quotation marks are from State ex rel Cramer v.
Judges of County Court, Cape Girardeau County, 91 Mo., 452, 3 S. W., 844
(1887) ; p. 454 in official report, and were quoted in Seibert v. Lewis (also cited
as Seibert v. U. S.), 122 U. S., 284, 30 L. Ed., 1161, 7 S. Ct., 1190 (1887); p.
298 in official report, whence Justice Holmes seems to have taken them.
'See note 32; pp. 56-57 in official report.
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